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ANTITRUST LAW

useless. 71 Employees who feel they have been subjected to sexbased wage discrimination and can meet the equal work standard should consider a claim under the EPA. An advantage of
bringing a claim under the EPA is its two-year statute of limitations, or three years where there is a willful violation,7 compared to Title VII's general 180-day limitation. 8 In addition,
under the EPA an employee can proceed directly against the
employer, whereas under Title VII the employee must go
through the EEOC or a state agency charged with enforcing
fair employment laws.7 9
III. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Gunther decision, plaintiffs can now establish a prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination
without showing that they performed work substantially equal
to that performed by members of the opposite sex who received higher wages. The Court's narrow construction of the
Bennett Amendment was consistent with its recognition of
the broad remedial purpose of both the EPA and Title VII.
Although it is uncertain how far courts will go in extending
Title VII claims, based on the Court's reliance on the wellsettled view that Title VII is aimed at negating all forms of
discrimination, the courts have a clear rationale to extend
those causes of action far beyond the defunct equal work
standard.
MICHAEL

J. BENNET

ANTITRUST LAW - Contribution - Contribution
Between Joint Tortfeasors Denied Under Federal
Antitrust Laws. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981). The United
States Supreme Court recently attempted to resolve the con76. This position is contrary to that of the dissent. 101 S. Ct. at 2263.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200ee-5(e) (1976).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a-d) (1976). For a discussion of the procedures for bringing a sex discrimination suit, see B. Hall, P Horowitz & C. Dupree, The Role of
Federal Government in EliminatingDiscrimination,in NIN'H NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON WOMEN AND THE LAW: WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOURCE BOOK 182 (1978); A. BABCOCK, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, 368-75, 498-504 (1973).
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troversy over when courts should allow contribution among
tortfeasors jointly liable under federal regulatory statutes.
This controversy has raged for years among commentators
and the lower federal courts. In Texas Industries,Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,Inc.,' the Court refused to allow contribution
among violators of federal antitrust statutes. Instead of evaluating the broad policy considerations presented by opponents
and proponents of contribution, the Court applied the principles of statutory construction and federal common law. Resolutioi of the conflicting policy arguments was expressly left to
Congress.2
Before outlining the Supreme Court's process of analysis,
this note will briefly discuss the controversy surrounding contribution among tortfeasors where not expressly provided for
by federal statutes. Next follows an evaluation of how the
Court applied statutory interpretation and federal common
law standards. Finally, this note questions whether the Court
should have considered the policy reasons, what result such
considerations would have produced, and what impact this decision is likely to have upon future cases involving federal regulatory statutes which are silent regarding contribution.

I.

THE CASE

The lawsuit in question began when the Wilson P Abraham Construction Corporation sued Texas Industries, Inc., alleging that Texas Industries and other unnamed companies
engaged in a conspiracy to "fix" prices of ready-mix concrete
in the New Orleans, Louisiana area,' in violation of the Sherman Act 4 and the Clayton Act.5 Texas Industries learned that
the alleged co-conspirators were Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
Jimco, Inc., and OKC Dredging, Inc.,6 and filed a third-party
1. 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981).
2. Id. at 2070.
3. Wilson P Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 899 (5th
Cir. 1979).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
6. 604 F.2d at 899.
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complaint seeking contribution from the three firms if7 Texas
Industries was ultimately found liable to the plaintiff.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana dismissed the third-party complaint with
prejudice, finding no right to contribution among violators of
federal antitrust laws.8 Texas Industries appealed, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari10 "to resolve a conflict
in the circuits."11
In unanimously affirming the circuit court's opinion, 12 the
Supreme Court commented that the arguments favoring and
opposing contribution 3 ignored "a very significant and perhaps dispositive threshold question: whether courts have the
power to create such a cause of action absent legislation and,
if so, whether that authority should be exercised in this context." 4 Having found no express or implied statutory right to
contribution, and no right to fashion federal common law, the
Court deferred to Congress for evaluation of the broad policy
factors involved.1 5
II. THE CONTRIBUTION CONTROVERSY
A. The Conflict Among the Commentators
Contribution allows "a tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered . .

to recover proportional shares of the

judgment from other joint tortfeasors whose negligence contributed to the injury and who are also liable to the plaintiff."10 A number of arguments exist in support of and in opposition to contribution among tortfeasors.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 351 (1980).
11. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2062 (1981).
12. Id. at 2070.
13. Id. at 2064-65.
14. Id. at 2065-66.
15. Id. at 2066-70.
16. Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See
generally 18 Am.Jur. 2d Contribution § 1 (1965). Thirty-four states have adopted
contribution statutes. For a list of the states and the statute numbers, see Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1578 n.17 (1981).
17. Factors argued in support of allowing contribution include fairness, deterrence, better compliance and enforcement, and avoidance of coercive settlements.
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Despite the large number of factors opposing contribution,
the commentators generally agree that contribution should be
allowed because it is the only method likely to provide fair
treatment to all parties by ensuring that each culpable party
will pay its fair share.' 8 The suggestion that the courts wait
for Congress to act is generally labeled as the weakest argument opposing contribution. 9 This is, however, precisely what
the Supreme Court relied upon in Texas Industries.2 °
B. The Conflict Among the Courts
As early as 1799, courts denied contribution to joint
tortfeasors. 2' That rule was modified slightly in 1905 in Union
Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R.,2 2 when the United
States Supreme Court distinguished between tortfeasors
equally at fault and tortfeasors jointly liable only because the
misconduct or negligence of one party created liability in the
Factors argued in opposition to allowing contribution include increased complexity of
suits, undermining of plaintiff's control of the suit, assistance of wrongdoers, providing greater deterrence through fear of being liable for the entire amount, discouragement of settlements, and acting against congressional intent. See, e.g., Jacobson, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Necessary Solution to a Recurring
Problem, U. FLA. L. REv. 217, 238 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Jacobson]; Rose, Contribution in Antitrust: Some Policy Considerations,48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1605, 1609-10
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Rose]; Note, ContributionBetween Partiesto a Discriminatory Collective BargainingAgreement, 79 MICH. L. REV. 173, 181 (1980). See generally W PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886A (1979).
A discussion of the merits of each of these policy reasons, together with an analysis of the effect of each upon this case in particular and the law in general, is beyond
the scope of this note. The cited commentators and secondary authorities provide
extensive analysis for each reason.
For further discussion, see, e.g., Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Treble Damages Suits, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
42 (1980); Floyd, ContributionAmong Antitrust Violators: A Question of Legal Process, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 183; Landers & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases,
94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); Note, ContributionsAmong Antitrust Co-conspirators,
48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 749 (1980).
18. E.g., Jacobson, supra note 17, passim; Rose, supra note 17, passim.
19. Jacobson, supra note 17, at 231 ("Probably the least substantial of the arguments against contribution is that the courts
should wait for Congress to act.");
Rose, supra note 17, at 1609 ("[fIt is difficult to entertain this argument with a great
deal of seriousness.").
20. 101 S. Ct. at 2070. Many lower courts, however, also felt that Congress should
be the branch of government to change the law. See nn.27-34 and 40-44 and accompanying text infra.
21. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
22. 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
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other. 23 The Court ruled that a tortfeasor in the latter category could recover both indemnity" and contribution from a
tortfeasor in the former category.25
Lower court decisions addressing contribution in an antitrust context have evaluated the same policy considerations
discussed by the commentators.2 In the first case to directly
address the antitrust contribution question, Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines,27 the district court2 8

found the Supreme Court's determination to abide by the
common law rule against contribution significant.29 The court
commented that the inclusion of contribution provisions in
23. This case was decided prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),

which held that there is to be no federal common law. Id. at 78.
24. "Indemnification, unlike contribution, permits a wrongdoer to escape loss by

shifting his entire responsibility to another party." Professional Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1979). See W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 51 (4th ed. 1971).
25. 196 U.S. at 226-28.
The contribution question arose again in a 1952 admiralty decision, Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). The United States
Supreme Court recognized that contribution has been allowed since the 12th century
in joint liability maritime collision cases, but refused to "attempt to fashion new judicial rules of contribution" in noncollision cases, deferring instead to congressional action. Id. at 285. The Court was concerned that all interested parties were not fully
represented by the parties to a lawsuit, and stated that "legislative consideration and
action can best bring about a fair accommodation of the diverse but related interests
of these groups. The legislative process is peculiarly adapted to determine which of
the many possible solutions to this problem would be most beneficial in the long
run." Id. at 286.
A recent admiralty case, Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106
(1974), limited Halcyon Lines to its facts and allowed contribution in a noncollision
suit. Lower courts have interpreted the Cooper contribution decision as an indication
that the Supreme Court will, in certain cases, allow contribution absent a legislative
creation of the right. E.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1183; Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 253 (3rd Cir.
1980), cert. granted sub nom. AFL-CIO v. G.C. Murphy Co., 101 S. Ct. 2013 (1981)
(judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Northwest
Airlines, Inc.). The Supreme Court, however, recently emphasized that Cooper was
limited to admiralty cases, and did not establish a "general federal right to contribution." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. at 1583.
26. See note 17 supra.
27. 298 F Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
28. The district court cited Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), and Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196
U.S. 217 (1905).
29. The determination was significant because the Supreme Court has the power
to develop new admiralty rules. 298 F Supp. at 1344.
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the Securities Acts of 193310 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193431 was evidence that Congress was aware of the common law rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors and
therefore made express allowance for contribution where desired. Absent such express provision in the antitrust acts,32
the district court felt judicial departure from the common law
rule would be presumptuous.
Several other district courts subsequently denied contribution in antitrust cases,34 but no appellate court addressed the
issue until 1979. In Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. NatinalBeauty Supply, Inc., 5 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered and rejected five reasons for opposing contribution.3 6 The circuit court viewed the provisions for
contribution under the security laws as indications that Congress would probably include similar provisions in the antitrust laws if those laws were being drafted today." Additional
arguments in opposition to contribution were rejected even
more summarily The court held that fairness required that
contribution be allowed so that all violators would be held liable. "We are convinced that the result of automatically
prohibiting contribution among antitrust defendants in all circumstances would be to allow a significant number of antitrust violators to escape liability for their wrongdoing and
thereby undermine the policy of the antitrust laws."38
The next appellate court to consider the issue was the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wilson P Abraham Con30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
31. 15 U.s.C. §§ 77b-e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-d, 78e-1, 78m-o, 78o-3 to 78hh
(1976).
32. "Antitrust acts" is a generic term for congressional acts dealing with

monoplies and combinations in restraint of trade. The term is often used to refer to
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, jointly.
33. 298 F Supp. at 1345-46.
34. For a list of the other district court cases, see Jacobson, supra note 17, at 217
n.4.
35. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
36. Id. at 1183-85 (These reasons were: (1) congressional intent and inaction; (2)
plaintiff's control of the lawsuit; (3) deterrent to settlement; (4) greater complexity;
and (5) elimination of deterrence.).
37. Id. at 1183-84. The dissent, however, argued that since Congress has had opportunity to counteract the lower court decisions against contribution, but has chosen
not to do so, the courts should not act instead. Id. at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting in

part).
38. Id. at 1185.
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struction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc.8 9 After reviewing
and rejecting appellant Texas Industries' arguments in support of contribution," the court decided that the policy reasons advanced by proponents of contribution were too inconclusive, and stated that "to forge a new rule with questionable
benefits and such possible detriments is a bad practice."' 41 The
court felt that a no-contribution rule served the deterrence
purpose of the antitrust laws,'42 and concluded by pointing out
that Congress is "a forum better suited to evaluation of the
43
competing interests and policies involved.'
Although commentators have discarded as insubstantial
any suggestion of waiting for Congress to act,"4 the federal
courts have generally decided that changing the common law
rule would be inappropriate without a congressional evaluation of each of the policy reasons advanced. Even the Eighth
Circuit's decision allowing contribution is grounded in what
the court perceived Congress would do if considering the contribution question today.
C. The Attempt to Resolve the Conflict
The lower federal courts and various commentators have
argued the policy reasons for and against allowing contribution where not expressly provided for m a regulatory federal
statute. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, 5 decided immediately prior to Texas Industries, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the contribution issue in the context of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Like the antitrust laws, those
statutes include no express provision for contribution when
two or more parties have violated the statutes. 46 The Court
rejected the equity and policy reasons advanced in support of
contribution, noting that such considerations should be ad-

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 901-05.
Id. at 906.
Id. at 901-05.
Id. at 906.
See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981).
Id. at 1580.
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dressed to Congress rather than to the courts,47 and decided
that there was neither an implied right to contribution nor a
right to fashion federal common law.' 8
In deciding Texas Industries one month later, the Supreme Court applied virtually the same pattern of analysis to
decide the same question in an antitrust context. The Court
affirmed the circuit court's denial of contribution without
evaluating the policy reasons on each side, basing its decision
upon statutory interpretation and common law principles.
1. Statutory Interpretation
As early as 1584, the Court of Exchequer set forth basic
standards for statutory interpretation:
[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes
.,
four things are to be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the
Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.
4th. The true reason of the remedy.
And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy
and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act
49

The United States Supreme Court reflected this common
law when it listed standards for statutory interpretation in
50
Cort v. Ash:

First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted,"
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
Third, is
it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
47. Id. at 1578-80, 1584 n.41.
48. Id. at 1582, 1584.
49. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B. 1584), as cited in Jones, Extrinsic Aids

in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REv. 737, 757 (1940).
50. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law9 51
These four factors are to be addressed when determining con52
gressional intent.

Because neither Texas Industries nor the respondents alleged any express right to contribution," the Court looked for
an implied right to contribution," focusing on the intent of
Congress.5 5 Considering the statute in its entirety, 6 the Court
found the overall purpose to be "an intent to punish past, and
to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers." 57
The Court further ruled that not only did Congress' silence
on the contribution issue fail to create in Texas Industries a
right to a private cause of action,5 but the activities of Texas
Industries constituted precisely the behavior "Congress intended to regulate for the protection and benefit of an entirely
distinct class. '" Had Texas Industries been a member of the
protected class, a private remedy may have been allowed., 0
51. Id. at 78 (emphasis and citations deleted).
52. See 101 S. Ct. at 2066, and Northwest Airlines, 101 S. Ct. at 15.
53. 101 S. Ct. at 2066.
54. For an analysis of recent Supreme Court trends in statutory interpretation
regarding implied causes of action, see Note, A New Directionfor Implied Causes of
Action, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 505 (1980).
55. 101 S. Ct. at 2066.
56. A statute should be construed as a whole, not in small sections. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 (1957); 2A C.D. SANDs, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (4th ed. 1973).
57. 101 S.Ct. at 2066.
58. "[I]mplymg a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a
hazardous enterprise, at best." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571
(1979).
The Texas Industries,Inc. Court also noted a strong "presumption that a remedy
was deliberately omitted," quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1584 (1981), because, in over nmety years, the statute had not
been amended to allow contribution. 101 S. Ct. at 2069. ContraProfessionalBeauty
Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1183-84.
59. 101 S. Ct. at 2066 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37
(1977), reh. denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) (emphasis deleted)).
60. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Clcago, 441 U.S. 677, 693-94 (1979), wlch
cited Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), for its holding that a private remedy would be
allowed when the statute was created to benefit a particular class, and the plaintiff is
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Under the actual circumstances, however, there was no indication that Congress had any interest in "softening the blow" on
violators of the protective statute. 1 From these findings, the
Court concluded that no further statutory analysis was necessary for it to find neither an express nor an implied right to
contribution in the antitrust laws.62
2.

Federal Common Law
The Court next considered two areas in which federal
courts have authority to develop federal common law- where
there is a unique, overriding federal interest," and4 where
Congress has granted authority to the federal courts.
Although federal courts generally apply state law in all
matters, 5 certain situations require that federal law be applied."6 When a desired remedy is "not within the precise
scope of remedies prescribed by Congress,"' 7 federal courts
may fashion federal common law as long as the results are
consistent with congressional acts.68
The Texas Industries Court distinguished between the
federal interest in regulating interstate and international
trade and the "private suit involving the rights and obligations of private parties."6 9 While it recognized that there is a
federal interest in the fulfillment of the objectives of the antitrust statutes, the Court felt that "contribution does not implicate 'uniquely federal interests' of the kind that oblige
courts to formulate federal common law."70 The Court also
noted that Congress' constitutionally-granted authority to crea member of that class.
61. 101 S. Ct. at 2066. See also Professinal Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at
1189 (Hanson, J., dissenting in part): "In making the decision whether contribution is
to be permitted or rejected in antitrust actions, the primary inquiry must be which
course best furthers the public policy in favor of competition, or least detracts from
it."
62. 101 S.Ct. at 2066.
63. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
64. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
65. Erie R.R., 304 U.S. at 78.
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2067; Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103-05.
67. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 103.
68. Id. at 103-04.
69. 101 S.Ct. at 2068.
70. Id.
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ate laws in an area does not also automatically give the courts
power to develop common law in the absence of congressinal
action in that area. 1
In considering whether Congress authorized the federal
courts to create governing rules of law to implement the statute, the Court drew another distinction: the power to shape
the mandates of a statute enacted in broad, sweeping language versus the power to develop enforcement and relief
remedies arising under the antitrust acts.7 2 Although federal
common law is sometimes created to determine the consequences of violations of federal statutes,73 the Court did not
feel that such powers had been granted the federal courts
75
under the antitrust acts.74 Citing Northwest Arlines, Inc.,
the Court stated that "[iln almost any statutory scheme, there
may be a need for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete provisions. But the authority to construe a statute is
fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new
rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has not de'7 0
cided to adopt.

IIE.

ANALYsis

Initially, it appears that the Court simply chose not to deal
with the extremely complicated and necessarily extensive
evaluation of the broad policy reasons that must be considered before determining whether contribution should be allowed under the antitrust laws. Delegating that enormous task
to Congress was entirely appropriate under federal common
law, which provides that a harsh law is to be remedied by
amendment or repeal, not by interpretation. 7 Moreover, "[n]o
statute is to be construed as altering the common law, further

71. The Court was referring here to Congress' authority under article I, § 8 of the
United States Constitution to regulate interstate and international trade. 101 S. Ct.
at 2068-69.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 519 (1959); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson
Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
74. 101 S. Ct. at 2069-70.
75. 101 S. Ct. at 1583.
76. 101 S. Ct. at 2070 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 1583).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1950); United States v.
Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1948). If this were not the case, the judicial branch would
have lawmaking authority superior to that of the legislative branch.
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than its words import. It is not to be construed as making any
innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express." s The Court would have overstepped its bounds had it
authorized a major change in the law without first deferring to
Congress.
Whether the outcome of the case would have been different if the Court had, in fact, based its decision upon the broad
policy considerations is impossible to ascertain. The Court
carefully avoided any evaluation of the arguments, and
neither expressly rejected the arguments favoring contribution
nor adopted the arguments opposing contribution.7 9 Giving no
indication of its own sentiments, the Court stated it was "unable to discern any basis in federal statutory or common law
"80
that allows federal courts to fashion the relief urged
By firmly and clearly stating its intent to adhere to traditional standards of statutory interpretation and development
of federal common law, the Court has established precedent
for future litigants seeking remedies not expressly allowed by
federal regulatory schemes. The Court clearly has no intention
of becoming embroiled in a series of evaluations of equitable
and policy considerations. It is more likely that the Court will
analyze congressional intent and the scope of federal common
law to determine whether changes should be made by Congress or the Court. In light of the federal courts' limited ability to fashion federal common law, and the results of the
Court's analyses in Texas Industries, Inc. and Northwest Airlines, Inc., it is probable that similar questions arising under
other federal regulatory statutes will also be deferred to Congress for resolution."1
Rather than allowing courts and commentators to guess at
congressional intent regarding contribution under federal regulatory statutes, Congress must now state its position clearly
if any such right was, in fact, intended. The Court has expressly 'tated that it will not create a right to contribution

78. Shaw v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1880). Accord
Scharfeld v. Richardson, 133 F.2d 340, 341-42 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (legislative purpose to
make any changes in the common law must be clearly and plainly expressed).
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2070.
80. Id.
81. The impact of congressional action or inaction, and the possible direction of
any legislative modifications, is beyond the scope of this note.
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where none exists. Thus, if Congress intends to allow contribution, it must state its intent in definite terms before the
Court will recognize that right.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the conflict
as to whether contribution should be allowed under federal
regulatory statutes which do not expressly provide for contribution. By deciding that it cannot imply a private right to
contribution unless Congress explicitly provides for one, the
Court has thrown the ball into Congress' court. Congress must
now evaluate the equity and policy factors and determine
whether violators of federal regulatory statutes should be entitled to contribution. Whatever the outcome when and if Congress makes that determination, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court, as presently composed, will interfere.
MARNA M. TEss-MATTNER

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

Fifth Amendment -

Re-

quested Instruction on Failure to Testify Required.
Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981). The fifth
amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' In Carter
v. Kentucky,2 the United States Supreme Court held that
upon a defendant's request a trial judge must instruct the jury
that it should not infer guilt from the defendant's failure to
testify. The Court based its decision in part upon Griffin. v.
California,3 in which it had held that the fifth amendment
forbids adverse comment to the jury on a defendant's refusal
to testify. The Griffin Court found that such adverse comment
is an unacceptable "penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege."'4 In Carter,the Court held that fail-

ure to give a requested "no adverse inference" instruction is a
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V

2. 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981).
3. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
4. Id. at 614.

